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Abstract: 
This study is an attempt to evaluate the effects of product and labour market regulations on 
industry productivity through their various impacts on changes in production prices and 
wages. In a first stage, the estimation of a regression equation on an industry*country panel, 
with controls for country*industry and country*year fixed effects, show that multi-factor 
productivity is negatively and significantly influenced by both indicators of industrial prices 
from same industry and weighted average of industrial prices from other industries, and by 
indicators of country wages weighted by industry labour shares for low and high skilled 
workers. In a second stage, an economic policy simulation of the implications of these results 
on the basis of their calibration by the OECD product and labour market anti-competitive 
regulation indicators suggests that nearly all countries could expect sizeable gains in 
multifactor productivity from deregulation reforms. 
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I. Introduction 
A large body of literature investigates the productivity impacts of product and labour market 
imperfections, and of the anti-competitive regulations establishing and supporting them (see 
Aghion and Howitt 2009 for a survey). This paper greatly extends the scope of two previous 
studies by the authors (Bourlès et al., 2013, and Cette, Lopez and Mairesse, 2013) that focus 
only on the indirect productivity impact of non-manufacturing regulations. By considering the 
effects of product and labour market regulations on industry productivity through their 
various impacts on production prices and wages, it allows to assess and compare the relative 
size of the different channels of direct and indirect impacts of product and labour market 
imperfections. The paper relies on country*industry panel that is basically the same as in the 
other two previous studies. It also takes advantage of the rich information provided by the 
OECD regulation indicators, but it does so only indirectly for economic policy calibration and 
simulation purposes. 
The originality of our new approach is twofold. First, to our knowledge, it is the first attempt 
to assess the consequences on productivity of anti-competitive regulations in product and 
labour markets through their impacts on production prices and wages.1 Second, it does so by 
considering in conjunction the six channels through which regulations can impact MFP: direct 
and indirect influence of product market regulations on rent building in manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries, and direct influence of labour market regulations on the rent 
sharing process between firms on the one hand and skilled and unskilled workers on the other. 
Our approach is theoretically grounded in the model developed by Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003). In their own words, “their model is built on two basic assumptions: monopolistic 
competition in the goods market, which determines the size of rents; and bargaining in the 
labour market, which determines the distribution of rents between workers and firm.”(pp. 
879-880). In other words, firms can take advantage of the market power permitted by product 
market anti-competitive regulations to charge higher production prices and generate rents that 
they can be kept in the form of increased profits. Workers can also capture in the form of 
higher wages a share of these rents, which varies with their bargaining power, itself largely 
influenced by labour market regulations. Our empirical framework is an attempt to assess the 
productivity impact of regulations as mediated by their effects on the changes on production 
                                                            
1  Askenazy, Cette and Maarek (2013) rely on similar assumptions and data to analyse the effects of 
anticompetitive regulations on the country*industry changes in income shares. 
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prices and wages. It can be simply explained by the diagram of Figure 1, which we shall now 
comment. 
 
INCLUDE FIGURE 1 about HERE 
 
The right side of the diagram outlines the regression equation central to our investigation. It 
shows the channels by which the six price and wage indicators, key in the analysis, relate to 
Multifactor Productivity (MFP). The left side of the diagram shows the calibration 
relationships, which validate our use of six price and wage indicators as proxies of the product 
and labour market imperfections impacts, and allow us to perform simulations of the (MFP) 
gains resulting from structural reforms of product and labour markets, as gauged by the 
OECD indicators for Non-Manufacturing Regulations (NMR), Harmonized tariffs (HT) and 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). 
The regression equation assumes that product market imperfections in an industry generate 
higher production prices and rents, which have a “direct” impact on MFP in the same industry 
and an “indirect” impact on MFP in other industries. The two price indicators of direct 
impacts measure the extent to which what we label “Manufacturing” industries and Non-
Manufacturing” industries are able to charge relatively high prices. They thus benefit from 
large rents and have fewer incentives to improve their efficiency and to innovate but also 
more financial resources to do so. We can thus expect an impact on MFP which could be 
either negative or positive. A negative sign may a priori seem more likely for non-
manufacturing industries generally sheltered from foreign competition and often protected 
from national competition by product market regulations. But this may also be true for 
manufacturing industries when they are protected from foreign competition by high tariff 
barriers. The two price indicators of indirect impacts are similarly indicative of weaker 
incentives to improve efficiency and to innovate by “downstream” industries when the rents 
they can generate are appropriated by “upstream” industries that have market power and can 
charge them relatively high prices for the intermediate inputs they must use. In this case, 
however, the expected impact on MFP is unambiguously negative. Again and for the same 
reasons this should be more likely when the upstream industries are non-manufacturing 
industries than manufacturing industries. 
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Our regression equation also assumes that, in conjunction with product market imperfections 
in an industry, labour market imperfections may result in higher wages and lower profits, 
entailing a negative impact on the industry MFP. Employment protection legislation, 
professional agreements and standards, shortage of qualified workers, etc., contribute to 
higher wages, implying that rents, which could have been fully appropriated by firms’ owners 
and shareholders, are shared with workers. In turn, firms have fewer incentives and financial 
resources to improve their efficiency and to innovate. We can thus expect that the low- and 
high-skilled wage indicators have a negative impact on MFP. Since high-skilled workers have 
a stronger bargaining power than low-skilled workers, it is also likely that the negative impact 
would be larger for the former than the latter. 
In Section 2, we describe our country*industry panel data sample, define in detail the six 
production price and wage impact indicators, and discuss in depth the econometric 
specification of our regression model. Our main estimation results are presented and discussed 
in Section 3. They show that the estimated coefficients of our six impact indicators are all 
negative and are both statistically and economically significant. In Section 4 we consider an 
illustrative policy simulation based on these results and on their calibration by the OECD 
product and labour market anti-competitive regulation indicators, which suggests that nearly 
all countries could expect sizeable gains in multifactor productivity over the years from an 
economic policy of deregulation reforms. Section 5 offers a short conclusion, stressing the 
plausibility of our results but also their fragility and limitations, largely inherent in the 
aggregate nature of our framework and supporting data. 
 
II. Sample, variables and regression model 
Our analysis is based on an unbalanced country*industry*year panel data sample covering 
fourteen OECD countries and eighteen industries: thirteen mainly in “Manufacturing” and 
five mainly in “Non-Manufacturing”. Due to the lack of data for several countries and/or 
sectors in the earlier years, it is relatively unbalanced ranging for each country*industry time 
series from 1987 to 2007 at maximum, 6 years at minimum and about 12 years on average. 
The fourteen countries are: Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. For the sake of convenience, “Manufacturing” refers here to: food products, textiles, 
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wood products, paper, chemicals products, non-metallic mineral products, metal products, 
machinery not elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), electrical equipment, transport equipment, 
manufacturing n.e.c., as well as construction and hotels & restaurants; while “non-
manufacturing” refers to: energy, transport & communication, retail distribution, banking 
services and professional services. Overall, our panel data sample contains 2,820 
observations, when we exclude the United States that we have taken in our analysis as the 
country of reference to control for unobserved technical changes at the industry level. 
Production prices, intermediate consumption and data used to calculate Multifactor 
Productivity (MFP) come mainly from OECD databases, while wages by skill level and 
physical investments by assets (used to calculate MFP) come from the EUKLEMS database. 
The regulation indicators that we use to assess the economic significance of our results and to 
calibrate simulations of the potential impacts of structural reforms are constructed on the basis 
of the OECD indicators for Non-Manufacturing Regulations (NMR), Harmonized Tariffs (HT) 
and Employment Protection Legislation (EPL). Appendices A and B provide detailed 
information on the panel composition, the construction of variables and the OECD indicators. 
They also show some simple descriptive statistics. 
As shown in the Diagram, in our regression model, MFP expressed in logarithm and noted as 
݂݉݌௖௜௧ for country c, industry i and year t, is related to four impact indicators based on 
production price data, two “direct” impact indicators ܦܯ_݌௖௜௧	and ܦܰܯ_݌௖௜௧ for 
manufacturing industries and non-manufacturing industries respectively, and two “indirect” 
impact indicators ܫܯ_݌௖௜௧	and ܫܰܯ_݌௖௜௧ for impacts on “downstream” industries originating 
from “upstream” manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries respectively. They also 
consist of two impact indicators based on low-skilled (L) and high-skilled (H) wage data 
noted ܬܮ_ݓ௖௜௧ and ܬܪ_ݓ௖௜௧. 
The direct country*industry price impact indicators are simply defined as:  
ܦܯ_݌௖௜௧ ൌ ݌௖௜௧	with	݅ ∈ ܯ				ܦܰܯ_݌௖௜௧ ൌ ݌௖௜௧	with	݅ ∈ ܰܯ 
where ݌௖௜௧ is the logarithm of the production price index relative to the GDP price index, for 
country c, industry i and year t, normalised to be equal to 1 in year 2000 (with ݅ ∈ ܯ for the 
manufacturing industries and ݅ ∈ ܰܯ for the non-manufacturing industries). Because of the 
aggregate nature of our panel sample, the price direct impact coefficients we can expect to 
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estimate with good precision are two average country*industry elasticities (not separate 
elasticities by country or industry, or country*industry). 
The country*industry price indirect impact indicators are composite indicators of the same 
production prices but for the upstream industries, and are defined as: 
ܫܯ_݌௖௜௧ ൌ ෍ ݌௖௝௧ ∗ ܷܵܧ௜௝
௝∈ெ	&௝ஷ௜
							ܫܰܯ_݌௖௜௧ ൌ ෍ ݌௖௝௧ ∗ ܷܵܧ௜௝	
௝∈ேெ	&௝ஷ௜
 
where ܷܵܧ௜௝ is the intensity-of-use of intermediate inputs, defined as the ratio of the 
intermediate consumption from industry j to industry i over the production of industry i and 
measured on the basis of the 2000 input-output table for the USA, taken as country of 
reference in our analysis. Here also, the coefficients that can be precisely estimated are two 
average country*industry elasticities with respect to the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing industries. For that purpose, interacting the log upstream industry price with 
the intermediate input intensity-of-use ratio is an appropriate way to take into account the 
intrinsic heterogeneity of their potential impact on downstream multifactor productivity, 
assuming that the higher this ratio, the higher the impact of a given change in upstream 
industry price. Note also that we prefer to use the USA 2000 input-output table as a weighting 
fixed reference in the computation of the intensity-of-use ratios to avoid endogeneity biases 
that might arise from potential correlations between the country*industry changes in such 
ratios and productivity. For a similar reason we also exclude the intra-industry intermediate 
consumption in the computation. 
The low- and high-skilled country*industry wage impact indicators are defined as: 
ܬܮ_ݓ௖௜௧ ൌ ݓ௖௧௅ ∗ ܵܪܣܴܧ௜௅													ܬܪ_ݓ௖௜௧ ൌ ݓ௖௧ு ∗ ܵܪܣܴܧ௜ு 
where ݓ௖௧௅  and ݓ௖௧ு  are the country’s real wage index, in logarithms, for the low- and high-
skilled workers of country c, and ܵܪܣܴܧ௜௅ and ܵܪܣܴܧ௜ு are the corresponding shares of 
labour costs in the production value of industry i for the USA in 2000. As in the case of the 
price direct and indirect impact indicators, the coefficients we can hope to estimate accurately 
enough are two average country*industry elasticities. Similarly to what we do to construct the 
price indirect impact indicators, we deem appropriate to interact the log country’s low- and 
high-skilled wages with the corresponding labour costs shares in production at the industry 
level for the USA in 2000, assuming that the higher these changes, the higher the impact of a 
7 
 
given change of a given change in low- and high-skill industry wage. To also avoid potential 
endogeneity biases we rely on the USA 2000 industry shares as fixed reference. Note finally 
that since we found that the estimated elasticities of the indicators based on separate low- and 
medium-skilled wages were not statistically different, we pool them for the sake of greater 
precision as one indicator, to which we simply refer here as the low-skilled wage impact 
indicator. 
Finally, our regression preferred specification is the following: 
݂݉݌௖௜௧ ൌ ߙ	ܦܯ_݌௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߚ	ܦܰܯ_݌௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߛ	ܫܯ_݌௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߜ	ܫܰܯ_݌௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ߣ	ܬܮ_ݓ௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߤ	ܬܪ_ݓ௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ߠ	݂݉݌௎ௌ	௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߟ௖ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߟ௖௜ ൅ ߟ௖௧ ൅ ߝ௖௜௧																												ሺ1ሻ 
In addition to the six price and wage impact indicators defined above, we included the log 
USA multifactor productivity for industry i and year (t-1) ݂݉݌௎ௌ	௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ in order to control 
mainly for exogenous technical changes at the industry level. We chose the USA, which is at 
the world productivity frontier in most industries, as an appropriate reference country for our 
analysis. ߙ,	ߚ, ߛ, ߜ, ߣ	and	ߤ are our elasticity parameters of interest. ߝ௖௜௧ is the idiosyncratic 
random error of the regression. ߟ௖, ߟ௜ and ߟ௧ denote the one-way country, industry and year 
fixed effects that are usually included in regression models estimated on panel data samples 
such as ours in order to control for distinctive country, industry or period characteristics, 
which could affect the estimates of the parameters of interest. ߟ௖௜ and ߟ௖௧ stand for two-way 
country-industry and country-year fixed effects. They are an important component in our 
regression specification for reasons we shall make clear in explaining our estimation method. 
As a variant of our preferred regression specification (1), we have also considered the 
following simpler but also less informative specification (2): 
݂݉݌௖௜௧ ൌ ߙ	ܦ_݌௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߛ	ܫ_݌௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߣ	ܬ_ݓ௖௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ
൅ ߠ	݂݉݌௎ௌ	௜ሺ௧ିଵሻ ൅ ߟ௖ ൅ ߟ௜ ൅ ߟ௧ ൅ ߟ௖௜ ൅ ߟ௖௧ ൅ ߝ௖௜௧																												ሺ2ሻ 
where	ܦ_݌௖௜௧, ܫ_݌௖௜௧, ܬ_ݓ௖௜௧  are respectively the production price indicators of direct and 
indirect impacts pooled over manufacturing and non-manufacturing industries and the wage 
indicators of impact pooled over low- and high-skills. 
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III. Estimation and main results 
Before presenting our main results, we must explain how they have been estimated to take 
care of various sources of potential biases, and in particular why we entered two-way country-
industry and country-year fixed effects in our regression model. 
The purpose of including ߟ௖௜ and ߟ௖௧ is to correct for the biases which could be due to the 
omission of relevant explanatory variables and also to attenuate biases potentially arising 
from other sources of endogeneity. It does so at the cost of reducing the variability of the data 
on which our estimates are actually based and at the risk of exacerbating downward biases 
from measurement errors in variables.2 Actually, entering ߟ௖௜ in regression (1) is a necessity 
in the present context since our price and wage indicators do not measure absolute levels of 
price or wage but are computed from price and wage indices normalized to be equal to 1 in a 
given reference year (in our case 2000). The evidence on which we rely for estimation is thus 
only based on the within country*industry changes over time of the variables in the 
regression, implying an important cut back in their standard-deviation conditional on ߟ௖௜ (as 
shown in Table A1 of Appendix A). Including also the country*year fixed effects ߟ௖௧	 entails 
an additional reduction of variability, especially large for the price indirect impact and wage 
impact indicators. It is, however, a useful precaution protecting from a variety of sources of 
potential estimation biases, such as differences in country multifactor productivity not related 
to product or labor market imperfections (and not captured by the presence of ݂݉݌௎ௌ	), and 
simultaneity biases due to changes in prices and wages in response to country productivity 
shocks. 
It is also possible to go one more step further and substitute industry*year fixed effects ߟ௜௧ to 
݂݉݌௎ௌ	 to control more fully for industry technical changes and other variation in industry 
multifactor productivity unrelated to product or labor market imperfections. As discussed in 
Cette, Lopez and Mairesse (2013), we can view the regression results obtained when 
including only the country*year fixed effects ߟ௖௧	 or both the country*year and industry*year 
fixed effects (ߟ௖௧	 and ߟ௜௧ሻ as providing respectively upper and lower bound estimates. We 
also explain that we can put some more confidence on the upper estimates, and we will 
                                                            
2  See Griliches and Mairesse (1998) who document and strongly stress such risk in the context of the 
identification of production function on panel data. 
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mainly consider them here. However, we present the two types of estimates in Table C1 of 
Appendix C. We find that, in spite of the inherent uncertainties of our analysis, our estimates 
of the six prices and wages impact indicators elasticities obtained in the two cases appear 
fairly robust overall: all six are negative as expected and three out of the six are in fact not 
statistically different from one another at the 5% or 10% confidence level.3 
Besides controlling for interacted fixed effects in our regression, we prefer not to rely on the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator but to implement the Dynamic OLS (DOLS) 
estimator proposed by Stock & Watson (1993). This estimator has the advantage to make sure 
that the estimated elasticities are not biased by short-term correlations between the variables 
and the idiosyncratic error ߝ௖௜௧, and that we can consider them as long-term parameters. When 
the variables used are non-stationary, the DOLS estimator eliminates these short-term 
correlations by including in the regressions leads and lags of the first differences of the 
potentially endogenous explanatory variables.4,5 Finally, note that we have lagged in 
regression (1) all explanatory variables by one year as another safeguard to avoid spurious 
contemporaneous correlations with productivity changes. 
 
INCLUDE TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Our main estimation results are given in Tables1 and 2, with the estimated impact elasticities 
in the last column 5 of Table 1 for the less detailed specification (2) and of Table 2 for our 
preferred more informative specification (1). Columns 1 to 4 of these two tables show the 
corresponding estimated elasticities for specifications in which the price direct and indirect 
impact indicators and the wage impact indicators are introduced sequentially. 
                                                            
3  Precisely, as documented in Table C1, the estimated elasticities, when we control for both ߟ௖௧ and ߟ௜௧ , are significantly smaller for ܦܯ_݌	,			ܫܰܯ_݌ and ܬܮ_ݓ than when we only control for ߟ௖௧., and 
they remain significantly negative for the first elasticity but not for the two others.  
4  We have found that it is enough to keep only one lead and one lag of these first differences.  
5  To support our long-term interpretation of our estimation results and our reliance on the DOLS 
estimators, we performed Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) and Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) panel data 
unit-root tests on our dependent and explanatory variables and Pedroni (1999, 2004) panel data 
cointegration tests. All the unit-root tests confirm that our variables are I(1), whereas the 
cointegration tests are somewhat less clear-cut, with four out of seven rejecting the no-
cointegration null hypothesis. However, because of the short time dimension of our panel data 
sample, the power of these tests is relatively weak. 
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Focusing first on the estimates for our preferred regression speciation (1), we see that the 
estimated elasticities for all six impact indicators in the full specification are negative and 
statistically very significant, with standard errors roughly proportional to their size (i.e. with 
comparable Student t-statistics and relative precision). We find very large and significant 
differences between the manufacturing and non-manufacturing direct and indirect price 
impact estimated elasticities and the low and high-skill wage impact estimated elasticities: 
they are twice for ܦܰܯ_݌ than for ܦܯ_݌ (about 0.8 versus 0.4), ten times higher for ܫܰܯ_݌ 
than for ܫܯ_݌ (about 5.0 versus 0.5), and almost twice also for ܬܪ_ݓ than for ܬܮ_ݓ (3.0 
versus 1.7). 
Looking now at the robustness of these estimates, we find that three pooled impact elasticities 
are only moderately decreasing whenever another indicator is included, but not the point of 
becoming statistically different. The six detailed impact elasticities appear less robust. In 
particular the elasticity of ܫܰܯ_݌ varies from -5.1, if estimated only with ܫܯ_p, to -9.4 if 
estimated with all other indicators. Similarly the elasticity of ܬܪ_ݓ varies from -3.0 to -4.2. 
All six elasticities remain negative and statistically very significant, and on the whole 
satisfactory.  
 
IV. Simulation of the potential impact of structural reforms 
The estimation results for regression (1) appear quite satisfactory, i.e. with productivity 
elasticities of all our price and wage indicators of the expected sign, statistically significant 
and reasonably robust. However, they cannot unambiguously be interpreted in terms of 
productivity impacts of anti-competitive regulations in the product and labour markets, and 
thus cannot directly be used to assess the potential effects of structural reforms in these 
markets. Moreover, despite the great care we have taken to avoid specification error biases in 
estimating our regression model, it is indeed important to confirm that our production price 
and wage indicators indirectly capture the impacts of regulations. We address these two issues 
by calibrating them in relation to the OECD Non-Manufacturing Regulations (NMR) and 
Harmonized tariffs (HT) indicators on the one hand and to the OECD Employment Protection 
Legislation (EPL) indicators on the other hand. As documented in some details in Appendix 
B, the OECD indicators are constructed on the basis of very detailed information on laws, 
rules and market, country and industry settings, and they have thus the advantage of being 
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directly related to underlying policies and they can be considered, at least to a major extent, to 
be exogenous to productivity developments. 
The calibration we have performed simply amounts to four distinct OLS projections on the 
OECD indicators: two on the NMR and HT indicators respectively for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing production prices, and two on the EPL indicators for low- and high-skilled 
wages separately. The projection coefficients estimates we find corroborate our hypotheses 
that changes in production prices and wages are positively and significantly related to changes 
in the OECD regulation indicators. These estimates are shown in Appendix D. 
By means of this calibration we can interpret and assess the estimates of regression (1) in 
terms of two illustrative simulations of the potential long-term MFP gains by country. The 
first is an ex-post evaluation of the long term effects of the observed regulatory changes on 
the product and labour markets during the 2008-2013 period. This simulation, also detailed in 
Appendix D, shows that the MFP gains attributable in the long term to these changes are 
about 0.6% on average and are mainly due to reforms on product markets, with the higher 
gains (of about 2%) for Austria and Italy. 
The second simulation that we present now is an ex-ante evaluation of the potential long term 
effects of extreme, hypothetical, regulatory reforms if they had been implemented all at once 
in 2013. We suppose for the purpose of this simulation that the “lightest practice” regulations 
observed as of 2013 could be immediately enforced in all industries, where “lightest 
practices” are defined as the averages of the three lowest levels of regulations in the fourteen 
countries of our sample.6 Such pervasive and simultaneous switch to lightest practices is thus 
an overly extreme, simplified, illustration of structural reforms in product and labour markets, 
ignoring of course the many and great institutional and political difficulties of 
implementation. The results of this simulation are presented in the Bar chart of Figure 2, 
where the height of bars indicates the long-term overall MFP impacts of adopting lightest 
practices for each country, and the breath of their components corresponds to the 
contributions of adopting the lightest practices related to the NMR, HT and EPL regulations 
respectively. 
                                                            
6  Although we take the USA as the reference country and thus exclude it from our estimation 
sample; we include it in our simulation and in the definition of lightest practices, by simply 
extending to this country the average impact elasticity estimates obtained for the thirteen countries 
of the estimation sample. Note also that we assume that the HT indicators in 2013 are the same 
as in 2008, since OECD stopped computing them after this year. 
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We see that the average MFP long term gains are of about 4.4%, but that they vary broadly 
across countries, depending on the initial regulation levels, from 1.1% in the UK to 7.0% in 
the Czech Republic. The regulatory components of these gains differ widely across countries 
from one another in absolute size but are close enough in relative terms. The average MFP 
gains from product market reforms amount to 2.5%, and they arise for 60% and 26% from 
respectively the indirect and direct impacts of the NMR and HT reforms in non-manufacturing 
industries, and for only about 6% and 8% from respectively the indirect and direct impacts of 
these reforms in manufacturing industries. The average gains from the EPL reforms are of 
about 2.0%, resulting for 75% and 25% from respectively the low-skilled and high-skilled 
labour market reforms. It is also interesting to point out the positive correlations between the 
size of the simulated MFP gains from the HT and EPL reforms and from the NMR and EPL 
reforms: respectively 0.26 and 0.21 as computed over fourteen countries. This is significant 
evidence of the complementary linkage between the productivity impacts of regulations on 
the product and labour markets which is stressed in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2013).  
The average and country simulated MFP impacts from a sudden shift to the lightest regulatory 
practices shown in Figure 2 are long term gains. As also detailed in Appendix D, on the basis 
of a complementary approximate analysis of the respective adjustments of the changes in 
MFP, production prices and wages and OECD indicators, we can have an idea of the overall 
speed of evolution to the long term equilibrium. The results are illustrated by the graphs in 
Figure 3 for the five following large European countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and 
the UK. They suggest that on average about 30% of the long-term MFP gains could be 
achieved after six years on average. 
 
INCLUDE FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE 
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V. To conclude 
This study is an attempt to assess the productivity consequences of anti-competitive 
regulations in product and labour markets by investigating them through the lens of an 
analysis of the relationships between changes in production prices and wages and changes in 
multifactor productivity. In our analysis, production prices and wages are indicative of rent 
building and sharing processes, which impede productivity in different ways and to different 
extents, and which stem from market imperfections as gauged by the OECD product and 
labour market regulations indicators. The results are encouraging notwithstanding the great 
difficulties of the approach and limitations of relying on a macroeconomic country*industry 
panel. Two simulations, respectively ex-post and ex-ante, based on these results suggest that 
nearly all countries, particularly European countries, can expect significant gains in 
multifactor productivity over the years from economic policies reforming anticompetitive 
regulations on the product and labour markets. 
Our estimates and simulations suffer clearly from various weaknesses, due in particular to the 
data limitation, with implications of course on the econometric methods implemented. They 
should be taken with particular caution and the policy indications that they suggest considered 
as tentative. In particular, the ex-ante simulation of an extreme, hypothetical of a programme 
of product and labour market reforms consisting in the immediate adoption of country lightest 
regulation practices must only be viewed as illustrative. We also do not consider in our 
analysis the great institutional, political and social difficulties that the implementation of such 
ambitious structural reform programmes usually encounters. 
We can stress, however, that the evidence concerning the indirect impact of product market 
regulatory changes in non-manufacturing, which is strongest in our present results analysis, is 
very much consistent with our previous two evaluations based on an approach largely 
different in important respects from the one followed here (see Bourlès et al., 2013, and Cette, 
Lopez and Mairesse, 2013). We can also mention that a number of historical country 
experiences seem to confirm that ambitious structural reform programmes implemented over 
the last decades have had very large multifactor productivity impacts. This is the case of the 
reform programmes implemented in the Netherlands in the early 1980 or in Australia, Canada 
and Sweden in the early 1990 that have been followed in the subsequent decade by a much 
faster growth in multifactor productivity (see Bergeaud, Cette and Lecat, 2014). 
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Figure 1: Diagram of the overall framework 
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Figure 2: Simulated long-term impacts on MFP 
from the adoption of the lightest practices by country 
 
 
 
EPL – High-Skilled and EPL – Low-Skilled: Long-run impacts through high and low-skilled 
wages, respectively. 
NMR – Indirect and NMR – Direct: Long-run indirect and direct impacts through production 
prices in non-manufacturing industries, respectively. 
HT – Indirect and HT – Direct: Long-run indirect and direct impacts through production 
prices in manufacturing industries, respectively. 
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Figure 3: Simulated evolution of impacts on MFP  
from the adoption of the lightest practices 
 for France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom 
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Table 1:  Main estimates for less detailed regression specifications  
Dependent variable: MFP (݂݉݌) 
 
 
Dependent 
variable: ࢓ࢌ࢖ (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
US MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖ࢁࡿ) 0.688*** 0.821*** 0.704*** 0.808*** 0.720*** 
[0.014] [0.013] [0.014] [0.012] [0.014] 
Direct prices (D_p) -0.513*** 
[0.034] 
 -0.523***  -0.441*** 
 [0.033]  [0.033] 
Indirect prices (I_p)  -0.486*** -0.546***  -0.479*** 
 [0.074] [0.070]  [0.068] 
Wage impact 
indicator (J_w) 
   -2.338*** -2.091*** 
   [0.165] [0.170] 
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 
R-squared 0.779 0.760 0.785 0.774 0.798 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors between 
brackets. Country*industry and country*year fixed effects included. All the explanatory 
variables are one year lagged. Estimator: DOLS estimates performed with one lag and one 
lead (corresponding coefficients not presented). 
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Table 2:  Main estimates for more detailed regression specifications 
Dependent variable: MFP (݂݉݌) 
 
 
Dependent variable: ࢓ࢌ࢖ 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
US MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖ࢁࡿ) 
0.713***  
[0.015] 
0.818***  
[0.012] 
0.731***  
[0.014] 
0.835***  
[0.013] 
0.756***  
[0.015] 
     
D
ir
ec
t p
ri
ce
s 
in
 
Manufacturing 
industries (ࡰࡹ_࢖) 
-0.481*** 
[0.037]  
-0.434*** 
[0.037]  
-0.379*** 
[0.037] 
     
Non-Manuf. 
industries (ࡰࡺࡹ_࢖) 
 -1.051*** [0.085] 
-1.072*** 
[0.088]  
-0.827*** 
[0.090] 
     
In
di
re
ct
 p
ri
ce
s 
fr
om
 
Manufacturing 
industries (ࡵࡹ_࢖) 
-0.488*** 
[0.072]  
-0.475*** 
[0.070]  
-0.446*** 
[0.069] 
     
Non-Manuf. 
industries (ࡵࡺࡹ_࢖) 
 -9.361*** [0.852] 
-7.490*** 
[0.863]  
-5.060*** 
 
[0.898] 
     
C
ou
nt
ry
 w
ag
es
 *
 
in
du
st
ry
 la
bo
ur
 
sh
ar
e 
High Skills (ࡶࡴ_w)    
-4.239*** 
[0.320] 
-3.043*** 
[0.329] 
     
Low Skills (ࡶࡸ_࢝) 
   -2.037*** [0.223] 
-1.743*** 
[0.215] 
     
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 
R-squared 0.777 0.773 0.792 0.779 0,804 
*** Significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors between brackets. 
Country*industry and country*year fixed effects included. All the explanatory variables are one year 
lagged. Estimator: DOLS estimates performed with one lag and one lead (corresponding coefficients 
not presented). 
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APPENDIX A:  STUDY SAMPLE AND MAIN VARIABLES 
 
 
STUDY SAMPLE 
Our study sample is an unbalanced country-industry panel dataset of 2,812 observations from 
1987 to 2007, which have been assembled from several sources of data, primarily the STAN 
OECD data base and which we have already used in our two previous studies (Bourlès et al., 
2013, and Cette, Lopez and Mairesse, 2013). For the purpose of this analysis we had to 
complete it as mainly concerns the production prices and wages information. It covers 
fourteen countries (Austria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States) and 
eighteen industries, which we pooled in two groups of industries delineated mainly for 
reasons of congruence with the OECD regulation indicators HT and NMR (see Appendix B). 
The first group, referred as Manufacturing, consists of thirteen industries, eleven of which are 
properly in manufacturing: food products, textiles, wood products, paper, chemicals products, 
non-metallic mineral products, metal products, machinery non elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), 
electrical equipment, transport equipment, manufacturing non elsewhere classified (n.e.c.), 
and two other industries construction and hotels & restaurants, which we thought were more 
appropriately included in this group. The second group comprise five network and service 
industries: energy, transport & communication, retail distribution, banking services and 
professional services, which for simplicity we call Non-Manufacturing industries. 
 
MULTI FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY (MFP) 
Our regression model, referred as (1) in the text, is expressed in terms of MFP levels. These 
levels are calculated for a base year (2000) and then extended over the sample period using 
data on MFP growth calculated as follows (using small letters for logarithms): 
Δ݂݉݌௖௜௧ ൌΔݒܽ௖௜௧ െ ൫ߙ௜.Δ݈௖௜௧ ൅ ߚ௜.Δܿ௖௜௧ூ ൅ ߛ௜.Δܿ௖௜௧ேூ ൅Δܿ௖௜௧ௌ ൅ ߠ௜.Δ݇௖௜௧൯ 
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where ܸܣ௖௜௧ is the Value Added at constant price of country c, industry i at time t, ܮ is the 
total employment in number of workers, ܥூ, ܥேூ and ܥௌ the physical capital stocks of, 
respectively, Information and communication technology (I), Non-ICT equipment (NI) and 
non-residential Structure (S), ܭ the Knowledge capital stock and ߙ௜, ߚ௜, ߛ௜ and ߠ௜ the output 
elasticity of these factors in industry i, approximated by the factor cost shares over total cost 
in the USA, averaged on the 1987-2007 period for each industry. Remember that regression 
(1) including country*industry fixed effects, our estimates of the impact parameters of interest 
are in fact independent of the MFP levels and relate only to MFP growth rates. 
Capital stocks ܥூ, ܥேூ and ܥௌ and ܭ are calculated from investment data using the so called 
permanent inventory method, assuming constant geometric rates of depreciation: 5% for non-
residential structures, 10% for non-ICT equipment, 20% for ICT equipment and 25% for 
R&D. In order to compute investments at constant prices, we have used investment deflators 
at the national level. Because of the lack of specific price information for R&D, we have used 
as a proxy the manufacturing production deflator. To improve comparability, we have 
assumed that in all countries for the ICT investments in hardware, software and 
telecommunications equipment the ratio of investment prices to the GDP price is the same as 
for the USA. This correction appears indeed as important since the USA is the country that 
uses most systematically hedonic methods to measure these prices and that the quality 
improvements have been considerable for these products during the study period. 
Data on value added and employment come from the OECD STAN database, data on R&D 
expenses from the ANBERD OECD database and on physical investments for non-residential 
structures, non-ICT and ICT equipment from the EU KLEMS database. Since R&D is not yet 
treated as investment in the national accounts collected by OECD, we had to correct both the 
industry value added by adding (“expensing out”) the intermediate consumption of their R&D 
activities, and the industry number of employees by subtracting the number of R&D 
personnel (“avoiding double counting”). Note also that we had to modify the price index of 
value added, and hence its value at constant prices, for the “Electrical and optical equipment” 
industry, which includes ICT equipment. We assumed as for ICT investment that in this 
industry the ratio of value added prices to the GDP price is the same in all countries as for the 
USA.  
The country Box Plots of Figure A1 shows that MFP growth rates cannot only be widely 
varying from year to year and across industries, but that they also differ significantly in 
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average by country, the median MFP growth i ranging from 0.35% in Spain and 1.01% in 
Canada to 2.97% and 4.28% in the Czech Republic. 
 
PRODUCTION PRICE AND WAGE INDEXES 
In regression model (1), as explained in section II of the text, we have computed the price 
indicators of direct and indirect impacts with respect to manufacturing and non-
manufacturing: ܦܯ_݌௖௜௧	, ܦܰܯ_݌௖௜௧, ܫܯ_݌௖௜௧	 and ܫܰܯ_݌௖௜௧	 on the basis of the 
country*industry production prices indexes to the country GDP price index, which are 
available in the OECD STAN database. We have computed similarly the low and high-skilled 
wage indicators of impact:	ܬܮ_ݓ௖௜௧ and ܬܪ_ݓ௖௜௧ using the country wage indexes relative to the 
country GDP price index, which come from the EUKLEMS database. As noted in the text, 
what we refer as low-skilled indicator ܬܮ_ݓ௖௜௧ is in fact combined with the medium- skilled 
indicator, with some gain of precision in estimation. 
The Bar chart of Figure A2 shows the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sample average 
annual growth rates of country production prices relative to GDP price. Except for Japan, all 
these growth rates relative to GDP price growth rate are negative, and quite limited in average 
per year. We see nonetheless significant differences across countries and a wider relative 
average decrease for manufacturing than for non-manufacturing industries. Similarly, the Bar 
chart of Figure A3 shows the sample average annual growth rate of real wages for high-
skilled and low-skilled workers. These growth rates are all positive and larger than for the 
production prices, but also differ markedly across countries in average per year. We also 
observe they are quite close for the low and high-skilled wages. 
 
VARIANCE ANALYSIS OF MAIN VARIABLES WITH RESPECT TO THE FIXED 
EFFECTS  
We have explained in Section III of the text why, in addition to the necessary inclusion of 
country*industry fixed effects, we have included country*year fixed effects in estimating 
regression model (1), and why we did not also include industry*year fixed effects. We also 
refer to Cette, Lopez and Mairesse (2013) to clarify why these two specifications tend to 
respectively provide upper and lower range estimates, which can be indeed verified in Table 
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C1 in Appendix C. One important reason we put forward was the trade-off between 
exacerbating attenuation biases from errors in variables and correcting for omitted variables 
and stricto sensu endogeneity. Such trade-off mainly depends on the reduction of variability 
in the dependent and independent regression variables, which is resulting from introducing 
fixed effects and which can often be massive.  
Tables A1 and A2 show in detail how such reduction is increasing with the progressive 
introduction of fixed effects. The analysis of variance in Table 1 starts from the regression 
specification in levels with country*industry fixed effects that we privileged. The analysis of 
variance in Table A2 starts from a specification in first-differences that also control for 
country*industry fixed effects by first-differencing country*year observations, but is more 
vulnerable to errors in variables than the fixed effect country*industry or “within 
country*industry” that we favour. 
In both tables, each column gives the residual standard-deviation of the regression on a 
sequence of fixed effects for each of variables in our analysis. Thus in Table A1, column (1) 
shows the dispersion if we were including only the country, industry and year fixed effects 
ߟ௖, 	ߟ௜, ߟ௧ while column (2) shows by how much this dispersion is reduced by also including 
the country*industry fixed effects ߟ௖௜ (which we have to do since all our variables are 
computed from country*industry indexes equal to 1 by construction in a given reference 
year). Columns (3) and (4) document the further reductions in dispersion by including 
respectively the country*year fixed effects ߟ௖௧ alone, which is our preferred specification, or 
both the country*year and industry*year fixed effects ߟ௖௧ and ߟ௜௧ . We can observe that the 
residual standard deviations in column (3) are particularly small and that they are even 
smaller in column (4) for ܫܰܯ_݌ , the indirect price impact indicator with respect to non-
manufacturing, and for ܬܮ_ݓ and ܬܪ_ݓ	 , the low and high-skilled impact indicators. This 
accounts for the relatively large standard errors of the corresponding estimated elasticities of 
our preferred estimates in column (6) of Table 1 in the text. It also accounts for the significant 
drop in these elasticities in column of Table C1 of Appendix C, which is probably related to 
the exacerbation of measurement errors biases. 
Estimation in country*industry log first differences may be easier to interpret than estimation 
in within country*industry log levels, which is what we do in another way by including in the 
specification of regression (1) the country*industry fixed effects ߟ௖௜ . The columns (1), (2) 
and (3) of Table A2 thus correspond respectively to the columns (2), (3) and (4) of Table A1. 
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We can indeed verify that the comparable evidence. Actually when we estimate regression (1) 
in country*industry log first differences, we obtain estimated elasticities that are not 
qualitatively different but that tend to smaller and have higher standard errors. In fact within 
level estimators have the advantage of being less affected by potential measurement errors in 
variables than estimators in first differences, which why we prefer the former in the present 
analysis (see Mairesse, 1990). 
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Figure A1: Country Box Plot of log MFP growth 
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Figure A2: Sample average annual growth of relative production prices 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3: Sample average annual growth of real wages, by skill level 
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Table A1 : Analysis of variance of the regression variables in log levels 
 controlling sequentially for fixed effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Fixed effects 
Country, industry, year Y Y Y Y 
Country*industry N Y Y Y 
Country*year N N Y Y 
Industry*year N N N Y 
MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖) 0.235 0.162 0.163 0.079 
USA MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖ࢁࡿ) 0.168 0.160 0.164 ---* 
Direct prices 
Manuf. industries (ࡰࡹ_࢖) 0.038 0.033 0.067 0.051 
Non-manuf. industries 
(ࡰࡺࡹ_࢓) 0.007 0.007 0.030 0.028 
Indirect 
prices 
Manuf. industries (ࡵࡹ_࢖) 0.080 0.067 0.03 0.019 
Non-manuf. industries 
(ࡵࡺࡹ_࢖) 0.042 0.031 0.003 0.002 
Country 
wages * 
industry 
labour share 
High-Skilled (ࡶࡴ_࢝) 0.071 0.009 0.007 0.004 
Low-Skilled (ࡶࡸ_࢝) 0.106 0.015 0.010 0.006 
Degree of freedom 2766 2571 2433 2173 
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820 
*The variability in (݂݉݌௎ௌ) is necessarily null when controlling for industry*year fixed 
effects. Columns (1), (2), (3) and (4) give the standard deviations of the variables after 
controlling for fixed effects. 
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Table A2: Analysis of variance of the regression variables  
in country*industry log differences 
controlling sequentially for fixed effects 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Fixed effects Country*year N Y Y Industry*year N N Y 
MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖) 0.066 0.064 0.052 
USA MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖ࢁࡿ) 0.058 0.057 ---* 
Direct prices 
Manuf. industries (ࡰࡹ_࢖) 0.030 0.028 0.021 
Non-manuf. industries 
(ࡰࡺࡹ_࢖) 0.018 0.018 0.018 
Indirect prices 
Manuf. industries (ࡵࡹ_࢖) 0.016 0.011 0.008 
Non-manuf. industries 
(ࡵࡺࡹ_࢖) 0.004 0.002 0.002 
Country wages 
* industry 
labour shares 
High-Skilled (ࡶࡴ_࢝) 0.004 0.003 0.002 
Low-Skilled (ࡶࡸ_࢝) 0.007 0.003 0.003 
Degree of freedom 2590 2432 2172 
Observations 2591 2591 2591 
*The variability in (݂݉݌௎ௌ) is necessarily null when controlling for industry*year 
fixed effects. Column (1) gives the standard deviations of the first difference of the 
variables, while columns (2) and (3) gives them after controlling respectively for 
country*year fixed effects and both country*year and industry*year fixed effects. 
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APPENDIX B: OECD REGULATION INDICATORS 
 
 
In this Appendix, we present shortly the OECD regulation indicators on which we rely to 
calibrate our manufacturing and non-manufacturing production prices indicators and our low 
and high-skill wages indicators. They are precisely 1) the Non-Manufacturing Regulation 
(NMR) indicators (available for five non-manufacturing industries), 2) the Harmonized Tariffs 
(HT) indicators, available for manufacturing industries, and the Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) restrictiveness indicators for the construction and hotels & restaurants, 3) and the 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicators. 
 
NMR INDICATORS 
The OECD NMR indicators measure the extent to which competition and firm choices are 
restricted where there are no a priori reasons for government interference, or where 
regulatory goals could plausibly be achieved by less coercive means. They are based on 
detailed information on laws, rules, market and industry settings and cover energy (gas and 
electricity), transport (rail, road and air) and communication (post, fixed and cellular 
telecommunications), retail distribution and professional services (see Conway and Nicoletti, 
2007, for a more detailed presentation).7  
The Bar chart in Figure B1 documents the values of the NMR indicators and the 
corresponding lightest regulation practices for 2013.8 The year 2013 is the one chosen to 
construct the lightest regulatory practices taken as target of the ex-ante policy simulation 
                                                            
7  Note that that we cannot include banking and financial services in our analysis, since the indicator 
of regulatory restrictions for this industry has been constructed by Serres et al. (2006) only 
for the year 2003. 
8  Note that the 2013 OECD NMR indicators take into account new questions. Using the updates 
provided by OECD results in insignificant changes in our estimation results. 
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presented in the text.9 We observe differences that can be very important both between 
country and within country across the four non-manufacturing industry regulations. 
 
HT AND FDI INDICATORS 
The OECD Harmonized Tariff (HT) indicators are computed on the basis of the ad valorem 
tariff rates applied to the most favoured nation at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized System 
Product Classification. They are aggregated into indicators using import-based weights at the 
2-digit (ISIC Rev. 3) industry level. These indicators are coded between 0 and 6 with 0 for the 
smallest tariffs (see Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003, for a more detailed presentation).  
Since no HT indicators do not exist for the ‘Construction’ and ‘Hotels and restaurants’ 
industries, we use for them the OECD Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) restrictiveness 
indicators. These indicators measure different forms of discrimination against foreign firms, 
such as i) restrictions on foreign ownership, i.e. limitations of the share of companies’ equity 
capital in a particular sector that are not applied to domestic firms; ii) obligatory screening 
and approval procedures for foreign affiliates; iii) operational constraints or controls for 
affiliates of foreign companies, including constraints to the mobility of foreign professionals 
working in these affiliates. They are primarily based on information from the GATS 
Commitments and country submissions to the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital 
Movements (see Koyama and Golub, 2006, for a more detailed presentation).  
The Bar chart in Figure B2 records the HT and FDI indicator values in 2007 (the last year for 
which the HT indicator information is available), as well as the corresponding values of the 
lightest regulation practices. As in the case of the NMR indicator values, we observe major 
differences between country and within country across industry. We see in particular that 
harmonized tariffs are very high in the food products (ISIC code 15-16) and in the textiles 
(17-19), with significant differences between countries. 
 
 
                                                            
9  However, note that, since the HT indicators are not available after 2007, we have simply assumed 
they remain constant afterwards for the purpose of our calibration and ex-ante simulation. 
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EPL INDICATORS 
The OECD provides various labour market regulation indicators: unemployment replacement 
rates, expenditures on labour market programmes, statutory minimum wages, union members 
and Employment Protection Legislations (EPL). Bassanini and Venn (2008) provide an 
empirical analysis of the impact of these various indicators on productivity. Our analysis 
focus on the EPL indicators, which are the most frequently used in the empirical literature on 
the impact of labour market regulations on productivity and growth. Like the NMR indicators, 
the EPL indicators are based on detailed information on laws, rules and market settings. They 
measure the procedures and cost involved in dismissing individual workers with regular 
contracts (data on collective dismissal is available only since 1998) and regulations on 
temporary contracts, including regulations on fixed-term and temporary work agency 
contracts (see OECD Employment Outlook 2013 for more information).  
The Bar chart in Figure B3 shows the values of EPL on regular and on temporary contracts in 
2013 as well as the lightest practice. We observe that are higher in continental European 
countries relatively to the other countries, and particularly as concerns regular contracts. 
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Figure B1: OECD Non-Manufacturing Regulation (NMR) indicators in 2013 
Scale 0-6 for each indicator, 0 for the most pro-competitive 
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Figure B2: OECD Harmonized Tariff (HT) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
indicators in 2007, by country-industry 
Scale 0-6 for each industry, 0 for the smallest tariffs 
 
The 2-digit (ISIC Rev. 3) industries (with their codes in parentheses) codes are the following: 
food products (15-16), textiles (17-19), wood products (20), paper (21-22), chemicals 
products (23-25), non-metallic mineral products (26), metal products (27-28), machinery 
n.e.c. (29), electrical equipment (30-33), transport equipment (34-35), manufacturing n.e.c. 
(36-37), construction (45) and hotels & restaurants (55). 
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Figure B3: OECD Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) indicators in 2013 
Scale 0-6, 0 for the most flexible country labour market 
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APPENDIX C:  ROBUSTNESS OF MAIN RESULTS  
 
 
In this Appendix, we document in Table C1 the robustness of our main results to the inclusion 
of interacted fixed effects and the choice of the DOLS method of estimation. 
As explained in Section III of the text, we include in our preferred regression specification (1) 
not only the country, industry and year fixed effects ߟ௖, ߟ௜ and ߟ௧, but also the 
country*industry and country*year fixed effects ߟ௖௜ and ߟ௖௧. Including these interacted fixed 
effects is a useful precaution to correct for the biases due to the omission of relevant 
explanatory variables, but also to potential sources of endogeneity such as differences in 
country multifactor productivity not related to product or labor market imperfections (and not 
captured by the presence of ݂݉݌௎ௌ	) and changes in prices and wages in response to country 
productivity shocks. Furthermore, including the country*industry fixed effects ߟ௖௜ implies that 
the evidence on which we rely for estimation is only based on the within country*industry 
changes over time of the price and wage indicator variables in the regression, a necessary 
requirement since they are computed from price and wage indices normalized to be equal to 1 
in a given reference year (in our case 2000). 
We also explained that going one step further by including industry*year fixed effects ߟ௜௧, 
instead of the lagged ݂݉݌௎ௌ	variable, would allow us to take into account industry technical 
changes more fully, as well as other variations in industry multifactor productivity unrelated 
to product or labor market imperfections. This would be, however, at the cost of reducing 
even more the identifying variability of the data (see the variance analysis in Appendix A), 
and it would be at the risk of exacerbating downward biases from measurement errors in 
variables. Following Cette, Lopez and Mairesse (2013), we concluded that the regression 
results obtained when including either ߟ௖௧	 only or both ߟ௖௧	 and ߟ௜௧ can be viewed as 
providing respectively upper and lower bound estimates, but that we can also put some more 
confidence on the upper bound estimates and focus on them as our preferred estimates. 
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Table C1 recalls our upper bound estimates for regression specifications (1) and (2) in 
columns 1 and 2 (corresponding to columns 5 of Tables 1 and 2 of the text) and documents 
the lower bound estimates in columns 3 and 4. We observe that indeed the lower bound 
estimates are much smaller in absolute values, and significantly so, than their upper bound 
counterparts, but that they remain all negative. However, the detailed estimates appear less 
stable than the pooled ones. We see in column 3 that the two pooled price direct and indirect 
impact elasticities, although reduced by a factor of two, remain statistically significant at 
confidence levels of 1%., while the pooled wage impact elasticity is smaller by a factor of 
four and remains also statistically significant but only at a 10% confidence level. When we 
separate in column 4 the price direct impact elasticities for manufacturing and non-
manufacturing, the price indirect impact elasticities from manufacturing and non-
manufacturing, and the low and high-skilled real wage impact elasticities, we find that four 
out of six of these lower bound estimates remain statistically different from zero at a 1% 
confidence interval. However, the price indirect impact elasticity from non-manufacturing and 
the low-skill wage impact elasticity, which stand out as very much reduced, are no more 
statistically significant from zero (even at a 10% confidence level). Such extreme reduction 
with loss of statistical significance is most likely related to the very small residual identifying 
variability of the two corresponding price and wage impact indicators ܫܰܯ_݌ and ܬܮ_ݓ (see 
Table A1 in Appendix A), and possibly reflect large attenuation biases due to the exacerbation 
of measurement errors in these indicators. 
 In Section III of the text, we have also justified the choice of a DOLS estimator instead of the 
OLS estimator to make sure that we estimate long-term elasticities, not affected by short-term 
correlations between the idiosyncratic error and the variables in the regression. We can see 
that the two types of estimates in fact appear quite close for all six elasticities by comparing 
the two columns 5 and 6 to respectively columns 1 and 2 in Table C1. However, Hausman 
specification test rejects strongly at a 1% confidence level the consistency of OLS estimator, 
which confirms our preference for the DOLS estimator. 
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Table C1: Robustness of main results to industry*year fixed effects 
 and to DOLS estimation 
Dependent variable: MFP (݂݉݌) 
 
Estimator DOLS OLS 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
US MFP (࢓ࢌ࢖ࢁࡿ) 0.720*** 0.756*** _ _ 0.687*** 0.717*** [0.014] [0.015]   [0.013] [0.014] 
D
ir
ec
t p
ri
ce
s 
in
 
All industries -0.441***  -0.248***  -0.460***  [0.033]  [0.030]  [0.031]  
Manuf. indus. 
(ࡰࡹ_࢖) 
 -0.379***  -0.130***  -0.406*** 
 [0.037]  [0.033]  [0.034] 
Non Manuf. 
(ࡰࡺࡹ_࢖) 
 -0.827***  -0.719***  -0.785*** 
 [0.090]  [0.080]  [0.080] 
In
di
re
ct
 
pr
ic
es
 fr
om
 All industries -0.479***   -0.278***   -0.392***   [0.068]   [0.090]   [0.064]   
Manuf. indus. 
(ࡵࡹ_࢖) 
  -0.446***   -0.271***   -0.359*** 
  [0.069]   [0.091]   [0.064] 
Non Manuf. 
(ࡵࡺࡹ_࢖) 
  -5.060***   -0.798   -4.838*** 
  [0.898]   [0.872]   [0.844] 
C
ou
nt
ry
 w
ag
es
 
* 
in
du
st
ry
 
la
bo
ur
 sh
ar
e All Skills -2.091***  -0.499*  -1.650***  [0.170]  [0.285]  [0.157]  
High-Skilled 
(ࡶࡴ_࢝ ) 
 -3.043***  -2.162***  -2.412*** 
 [0.329]  [0.477]  [0.292] 
Low-Skilled 
(ࡶࡸ_࢝ ) 
 -1.743***  -0.112  -1.327*** 
 [0.215]  [0.339]  [0.202] 
Observations 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 2820 
R-squared 0.798 0.804 0.872 0.877 0.783 0.788 
Fixed effects:       
Country*industry Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Country*year Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry*year  N N Y Y N N 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors between 
brackets. 
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APPENDIX D: EX-POST SIMULATION OF MFP GAINS FROM 2008-2013 
REGULATORY CHANGES, AND ASSESSMENT OF THE LONG TERM AND 
DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT CALIBRATION RELATIONSHIPS 
 
 
EX-POST SIMULATION OF MFP GAINS FROM 2008-2013 REGULATORY CHANGES 
We have based our ex post simulation only on the evidence provided by the OECD Non-
Manufacturing Regulation NMR indicators and Employment Protection Legislation EPL 
indicators, since the Harmonized Tariffs HT indicators are not available after 2008 (as noted 
in footnote 6 in the text). We have not also been able to include in our simulation the USA, 
since the HT indicators is also lacking too for 2008 for this country. The Bar chart in Figure 
D1 documents what have been the changes in these indicators over the period 2008-2013. It 
shows that Italy, France and Austria are the three countries that have implemented the most 
significant non-manufacturing pro-competitive regulatory reforms, while such reforms have 
been very modest in the other countries. Italy in particular has adopted several reforms in 
transport and communication industries and in professional services in the period. It also 
appears that the EPL type regulatory reforms have been very limited in countries. 
The Bar chart in Figure D2 shows the long-term MFP gains that can be expected from these 
regulatory changes. It is similar to Figure 2 in the text for the expected long term MFP gains 
under the extreme hypothesis of an immediate implementation in all countries of the 2013 
lightest regulatory practices. The evaluation method is the same in the two cases as explained 
in section 4 of the text. We have simply aggregated the country*industry estimated MFP gains 
at the country level by weighting them by the value added industry shares in national GDP. 
The differences in long term MFP gains across countries are thus directly related to the 
differences in the changes in NMR and EPL regulatory reforms. The estimated MFP gains are 
highest for Italy, then France and Austria. It is important to keep in mind, however, that these 
are long term expected gains, and that on the basis of our rough assessment of adjustment 
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speed we can consider that only about 20% to 30% of these gains have possibly been 
achieved as of 2014.  
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE LONG TERM CALIBRATION RELATIONSHIPS  
The long term calibration relationships that allow us to perform the simulation of the (MFP) 
gains resulting from structural reforms of product and labour markets, as quantified by the 
OECD NMR, HT and EPL indicators are documented in Table D1. They are estimated as four 
distinct OLS projections of respectively: in column (1) the country*industry changes on 
production prices in non-manufacturing industries on the NMR indicators; in column (2) the 
country*industry changes on production prices in manufacturing industries on the HT 
indicators; in column (3) the country changes in low-skilled wages on the EPL indicators for 
low-skilled workers; and in column (4) the country changes in high-skilled wages on the EPL 
indicators for high-skilled workers. The two calibration relations thus include 
country*industry and country*year fixed effects for production prices and separate country 
and year fixed effects for wages. The coefficients are all positive as expected, estimated very 
precisely for the first three relations, less so for the fourth  
 
ASSESSMENT OF THE DYNAMIC ADJUSTMENT CALIBRATION RELATIONSHIPS  
The DOLS estimator provides the long-term coefficients of the estimated relationships. To 
assess the dynamic path of impacts of the reforms, we rely on simple error-correction 
regressions and proceed in two steps. First, we compute the error-correction terms, noted EC, 
as the differences between the current values of our dependent variables (ܦܯ_݌, ܦܰܯ_݌, 
ܫܯ_݌, ܫܰܯ_݌, ܬܪ_ݓ, ܬܮ_ݓ, and ݂݉݌) and their long-term prediction.10 Then, we regress, the 
observed first differences in these variables (with Δ indicating a first difference) on the 
corresponding lagged error-correction terms:  
Δܦܰܯ_݌௖௜௧ ൌ ߨ௔ ∗ ܥܧ௖௜௧ିଵ௔ ൅ ߳௖௜௧௔  ,     Δܦܯ_݌௖௜௧ ൌ ߨ௕ ∗ ܥܧ௖௜௧ିଵ௕ ൅ ߳௖௜௧௕  , 
Δܬܪ_ݓ௖௜௧ ൌ ߨ௖ ∗ ܥܧ௖௧ିଵ௖ ൅ ߳௖௧௖   Δܬܮ௪೎೔೟ ൌ ߨௗ ∗ ܥܧ௖௧ିଵௗ ൅ ߳௖௧ௗ 		 , and  
                                                            
10  Note that this difference would be equal to the residual of the long-term estimation if we 
used OLS, but this not anymore the case with DOLS. 
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Δ݂݉݌௖௜௧ ൌ ߨ௣௚௙ ∗ ܥܧ௖௜௧ିଵ௠௙௣ ൅ ߳௖௜௧ 
Table D2 presents the corresponding estimation results. As expected, a positive error-
correction term has a negative and significant impact on the growth of production prices, real 
wages and multifactor productivity.  
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Figure D1:  OECD NMR and EPL indicators changes over 2008-2013 period 
Scale of the indicators in levels: 0-6, 0 for the most pro-competitive level. 
 
 
 
 
Figure D2:  Simulated long-term MFP gains expected from the NMR and EPL 
regulatory changes over 2008-2013. 
 
 
EPL – High-Skilled and EPL – Low-Skilled: Long-run impacts through high and low-skilled 
wages, respectively. 
NMR – Indirect and NMR – Direct: Long-run indirect and direct impacts through production 
prices in non-manufacturing industries, respectively.  
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Table D1: Long term calibration relationships 
 
Dep. variable Relative production prices Real wages 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Non-manuf. 
Industries 
Manuf. 
industries High-skilled Low-skilled 
NMR, HT and 
EPL 
regulatory 
indicators) 
0.024*** 0.031*** 0.030* 0.087***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.017] [0.017]
Observations 753 2067 238 238 
R-squared 0.457 0.201 0.808 0.828 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors between 
brackets. Country*industry and country*year fixed effects are included. 
(1): The regulation indicators are the NMR indicators in column 1, the HT indictors in column 
2 and the EPL indicator in column 3 and 4. 
 
 
 
 
Table D2: Dynamic adjustment calibration relationships 
 
Dependent variable MFP growth (ઢ࢓ࢌ࢖) 
Relative production 
price growth (ઢ࢖) Real wage growth (ઢ࢝) 
Non-
manuf. Manuf. 
High-
skilled 
Low-
skilled 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Error Correction 
term (EC) -0.215*** -0.235*** -0.025** -0.119*** -0.066** 
 [0.013] [0.027] [0.010] [0.036] [0.033]
Observations 2820 753 2067 225 225
R-squared 0.095 0.088 0.004 0.056 0.039
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. Standard errors between 
brackets. 
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